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Abstract
The discipline of security lacks formal conceptual tools which can be used by security
managers, advisers and consultants when attempting to provide effective seCIJrity. This
is because of security's relative age as a discipline, it is very new.

The aim oft he thesis was to contribute to the security discipline by taking
Underwood's ( 1989) idea of security decay and to a certain extent exploring and
fonnalising it. The security decay theory is primarily concerned with the influence
apathy has on security and how management react to risk materialisation when decay is
evident. The thesis focused on the first ofthese two components only.

In focusing on the influence apathy has on security, a number of Likert tests were
administered to a stratified sample of both security specialists and non- security
people. The security specialist sample provided good indications that effective security
will be provided when a synergy of functions and elements are implemented. This
sample also believed that apathetic attitudes towards security would cause the
effectiveness of security to decrease.

The results derived from the non - security sample were inconclusive, with no
determinations to be made. This sample were unsure as to whether or not effective
security was achievable, whether effective security would cause a lack of security
incidence and whether a lack of security incidence would result in apathy towards
security.
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The results achieved are only representative of the attitudes of the respondents from
within the sample. The two tests that derived conclusive results can not be generalised
across the whole security specialist population. This was the major limitation of the
thesis.

The recommendations resulting from the study include the need to further research the
security decay theory in a longitudinal study, as well as researching the section of the
theory which was excluded in this thesis. The implications for security specialists are
that they need to have an awareness of the ramifications of having effective security.
Also, the fact that the non - security sample were generally unsure about all sub concepts put to them highlights the need for efficient and effective awareness and
education programs.
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Definition of Terms
Security Decay :

a concept and phenomena where effective security
indirectly causes an attitude of apathy towards the
provision of security, resulting in ineffectiveness

Risk:

" The chance of something happening that will have an
impact upon objectives. It is measured in terms of
consequences and likelihood" (AS/NZS: 4360, 1995)

Security:

"... implies a stable, relatively predictable
environment in which an individual or group may pursue
its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of
destruction or injury" (Fischer and Green, 199?, p. 3)

Residual Risk:

The degree of risk an organisation is exposed to after
the implementation of countenneasures.

Risk Exposure:

The level of risk the organisation is exposed to prior to
countermeasure implementation.

Threat:

A threat may be defined as a situation, event or
action which will affect, or has the potential to
effect, the security of an asset
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Countermeasure :

A security measure, used to 'counter' a designated threat
or threats

Criticality :

Also known as consequence. A factor ofham1 or damage
which is to be considered when conducting a risk
assessment

Intelligence :

" The product resulting from the processing of
information concerning actual and potential situations,
events, risks and threats to an organisation and its
activities" (Blades, 1997, p. 2).

Defence in Depth :

A security theory concerned with the layering of
countermeasures to provide deterrence, a degree of
detection and delay, as well as aiding response actions

CPTED:

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. A
security theory outlining the benefits to be derived from
natural access, natural surveillance and territoriality
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When we have a free path, we go forward

If we meet 2n obstacle, we go around it

If the object can not be overcome, we retreat

When the enemy is unprepared, we surprise him

If he is alert, we leave him alone

(Bader Meinhof, www.tscm.com)
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CHAPTER!
INTRODUCTION
Background of Security Theory
Security as an academic discipline is in its infancy and has only relatively recentiy
begun taking its first steps towards being fully recognised in its own right. As a result
of this, the body of literature and conceplUaltools available for analysis are small
when compared to other, more well established disciplines.

However there are a number of related theories, ao; well as specific security theories,
that have been either adapted, evolved or developed over the years. Security theories
cover broad areas which are reflective of 1he nature of security itself. One will find
technological security theory, sociological security theory and

psy~hological

security

theory. The reason for such an integration of various fields into the security discipline
is because of security's wide ranging scope, within both an organisation and society.
There is a complex interrelationship between technology, people and management
processes within a security function and because of this, a variety of differing fields
have been utilised to aid in the provision of effective security. Each of these areas will
influence the practicing of security and it is for this reason that these areas are of
considerable importance.

As an example, the theory surrounding risk management did not originate from the
field of security, but from fields such as environmental science (Fiskel and Covello,
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1986), engineering (Crossland, Bennett, Ellis, Farmer, Gittus, Godfrey, Hambly,
Kletz, and Lees 1992), medicine (Cooper, 1985), political science (Glen, 1993) and

finance and insurance (Vaughan. 1982). However the application of this theory is welJ
suited to the provision of security and has therefore been integrated into the security
discipline by a substantial number of authors (Toft, 1997; Broder, 1984; Fites &
Kratz, 1993; Schultheiss, 1994; DePasquale, 1989; Fay, 1993; Oliver & Wilson, 1988;
Elbra, 1992; Strut! & Patrick, 1995; Custance, 1996: Healy & Walsh, 1996; and
Kinsman & Tarr, 1996).

This study sets out. as one of its primary aims, to increase the body of security
knowledge by developing and enhancing the term "security decay" which was first
used by Underwood ( 1989, p. 249) in his book entitled "The Security of Buildings."

The Security Decay Theory

The security decay theory can be viewed as consisting of a seven step process as seen
in Figure 1. The security decay theory ali a whole will include two primary
components; apathy. which is postulated to be caused by effective security, which in
turns creates decay, and an incorrect reaction to risk materialisation caused by decay.
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Effective
Security

I
Prevent
Attack

I
Apathy

I
By
Staff

I
By
Management

I
Security
Decay

J
Attack
Succeeds

I
Reaction

I
Increase
Security
Measures

Figure I: The Security Decay Theory

However the theory as a whole was not examined within the study, as this would have
presented too large a task. The section of the security decay theory, which was
examined, can be seen in Figure 2.
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Effective
Security

I
Prevent
Attack

I
Apathy

I
By
Staff

By
Management

I
Security
Decay
Figure 2: Security Decay Theory; section under examina:io11

The dependant variable within the section of the theory under examination in the
study is security decay, with the independent variables being effective security, the
prevention of threat occurrence and apathy.

Effective security refers to a state where security's role has been defined, the need for
security established and the level of protection required having been achieved.
Effective security is postulated to exist when the level of risk exposure is reduced,
through various means, to a level that is acceptable to the organisation.

It is postulated that the result of having effective security will be the possible

prevention of threat occurrences. A lack of security threat occurrences may result in an
attitude of apathy towards security by those influenced by it. When those people
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become apathetic, they may cease to comply with security policy and procedure,
which is postulated to cause a decaying of security effectiveness.

For people to become apathetic towards security, according to the security decay
theory, they must first believe that security can reach a state of effectiveness, and that
this will cause threat occurrences to be prevented. Also, they must believe that a lack
of security incidents will result in an attitude of apathy. If any of these variables are
missing within any given scenario, then the security decay theory will not be
applicable.

The theory is robust as it extends beyond giving reason to an erosion of security
effectiveness, by providing a possible explanation as to why management often react
with an over - kill of security col!ntenneasures. That is, when decay is attributable, a
higher level of security may not be needed, but the required action may be to reestablish the original level of protection. However this section of the theory is not
under examination within the thesis.

Background of the Security Decay Theory

The premise behind the concept of security decay is that the more effective is security,
the greater the probability that at some time in the near future, the need for security
will diminish. Thus security is postulated to be working towards its own demise
(Underwood, 1989, p. 249). This outcome results because of apathy on behalf of staff,
management and contractors towards security. Indeed Underwood (1989, p. 249) can
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be quoted as saying; "It [decay] is almost exclusively a function of the human
component of a security system."

If security is reducing security risk, then the perception generated by the stakeholders
towards security may be one of unnecessariness. When people do not perceive the
need for security, apathy towards it is the logical resultant effect.

In his book, Underwood ( 1989, p. 249-250) states that, "The provision of effective

security is paradoxically the first step towards decay." As we are aware, a paradox is a
statement that seems to be self-contradictory but contains a truth. Thus security decay
can be perceived as a paradox as security is ultimately working towards it's own
demise, as the more effective it is in theory, the less likely it will be needed in some
point in the near future.

Security within an organisation is, like other specialties, working towards a goal. All
of the planning and other efforts are directed towards achieving this goal (Bartol,
Martin, Tein & Matthews, 1995, p. 154). Ultimately this goal is directed towards
maximising the profit of the organisation by reducing the level of risk exposure and
devising means to management risk realisation. Security will be seen to be successful
if it is able to achieve this goal. To accomplish this, the security function must deter,
deny, detect, delay (Hayes, 1991, p. 93) and respond to attacks effectively and
efficiently.
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If security is effective, and it is able to repel or prevent attacks, as well as detect, delay

and respond to attacks, then what can be expected as a result?
The decay theory argues that the result of effective security is security being seen as
unnecessary (Underwood, 1989, p. 249-250). With effective security in place, there
are no incidents of threat occurrence. A situation where the security system is
unchallenged may result in the prevailing attitude by staff and management being that
security is unnecessary. It may be logical to think that if we have A in place to have an
effect on B, but when B is not present, then the need for A diminishes (where A is the
security countenneasure and B is threat occurrence).

When a threat eventuates it will come to the attention of management. The question
they wiJJ now ask is; 'As a security incident has occurred, were the measures in place
suitable'?

Underwood (1989) argues that often the answer to the above question is: as a security
incident has occurred, the measures could not have been suitable. Management will
then devise new security measures that offer a level of protection above that which the
original measures offered. The disadvantage in reacting incorrectly, such as increasing
the level of protection when decay is evident, is appropriately emphasised by Hansen
(1992, p. 44) when he states that;

"All too often security risks are taken seriously only after information [asset]
is lost. The reaction is a flurry of expensive and mostly ineffective
countermeasures."
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The security dec;:ty theory will be cyclic in nature as once management increases
security above the original level, it is argued that 'effective security' is achieved and
the process begins again.

Security Decay - an example
If an organisation had a policy in place that required the scanning of computer hard
drives for vituses before using, and over a given period of time there were no virus
attacks on the organisation's computer systems (as a result of this policy), the users of
the computer systems may believe that the scanning of hard drives for viruses is
unnecessary and a waste of valuable time. Underwood (1989, p. 249-250) argues that
at this point in the process, and as a result of security being seen as unnecessary, the
only logical result will be decay.

To continue the example, as the users feel that scanning for viruses is a waste of time,
they may bypass the scanning procedure. This amounts to decay in security as
management have a policy and procedure in place to counter the threat, but it is not
being complied with as security is now seen as unnecessary because of the lack of
threat occurrence (no virus attacks).

Decay is obviously not restricted to computer security efforts. It may also occur in
access control procedures, guard patrol procedures, confidential infonnation control
procedures, cash handling procedures and all other areas of security operations which
are reliant on the compliance by st:.1ff.

8

Security Decay : The erosion of effective security

Decay is now evident, as the users are not scanning for viruses. Then as a result of this
decay, a virus successfully penetrates the computer system and all data contained
therein is lost. Security will then be seen as necessary again.

With virus penetration (threat occurrence) comes a reaction by management which is
often inappropriate, as management did not contribute the cause of the threat
occurrence to decay. Management may now insist that integrity checkers, behaviour
blockers and disk validation systems be implemented (Ford, 1995, p. 141). This would
allow for a significantly higher level of virus protection. But in this circumstance, the
measures were suitable and it was the decay of these measures that resulted in the
threat materialising. Therefore all that is required is to re-establish and re -emphasis
the original virus scanning measures.

The Purpose of the Study

Security managers, consultants and advisors need to be able to refer to conceptual
tools when providing advice on complex security issues such as the management of
security risk. The greater the number of relevant analytical and management tools
available, the more likely it is that the security function can positively contribute
towards organisational goals.

The aim and purpose of the thesis was to contribute towards the generation of
conceptual tools in the security discipline. This purpose has been accomplished by
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enhancing the security decay theory through the testing of perceptions and attitudes of
this model.

The Significance of the Study

The security decay theory is one which has received little attention and one must
assume this to be because of its relative obscurity. To date, the security decay theory
had not been fonnally studied. While this situation alone may highlight the need for
further exploration of a theory, it is believed that th" nature of security decay and the
potential consequences that may arise from its occurrence warranted it being
examined.

Security from an application viewpoint, is a discipline of some importance as people
rely on it in all fonns for physical well -being, and organisations rely on it for the
protection of valuable and critical assets. The further development and refinement of
the security discipline therefore will provide innovative and effective ways in ensuring
the safety of the community a'i well as contributing towards the success of an
organisation.

Also, as the security discipline continues to develop, theories relating to differing
aspects must be explored. This exploration of the security decay theory will contribute
towards the goal, as the security discipline will have gained another conceptual tool
for analysis.

10
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Research Questions
There are a number of pertinent questions that must be considered before the
relevance of the security decay theory can be judged. Upon the completion of this
study, the research questions wiil have been sufficiently addressed, with consideration
for limitations and scope of the study.

While the testing of the entire security decay theory is beyond the scope of the study,
the questions of the theory that wiii be addressed include:

-What constitutes effective security and is effective security achievable?

-Does effective security cause an attitude of apathy towards the provisio'l of
security?

-Does an apathetic attitude towards the provision of security cause a decaying
of security?

For the security decay theory to be evident, security must be functionh~g so wen as to
cause people to think that there is no need for it. It is proposed that if security is not
effective, then security decay is not the cause of threat occurrence. This outcome
warrants the inclusion of the question regarding what constitutes effective security.
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An intriguing question of the study is whether or not people believe that effective

security will result in apathy. Will people believe that security becomes an
unnecessary burden when it has proved so successful as to prevent threat occurrence?
When there is no threat occurrence because of successful security, will people become
apathetic?

For the decay theory to be considered a relevant theory in the security discipline, it
must be shown that apathy towards security will cause security to decay, or decrease
in effectiveness. Establishing this effect is beyond the scope of this study and
therefore the assessment of peoples' initial perceptions will be an important first step
towards making a detennination.

12
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CHAPTER2

LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review

wm outline a number of factors that must be considered in a

study of security decay. As there have been no previous studies conducted on security
decay, the literature review will focus on relevant topics such as risk, security decay,
maintenance and decay, complacency and security decay, overconfidence and security
decay, and research methodologies.

Risk is a concept of immense importance from a security viewpoint. It is not possible
to implement a security program of any worth without first assessing and considering
the security risk. This principle is supported by Sennewald (cited in Broder, 1984, p.
7) who argues that;

" Before a question of security can be addressed, it is first necessary to identify
those harmful events which may befall any given enterprise."

Risk is often used in reference to security issues, but it may be argued that it is never
fully understood. Ansell and Wharton (1992, p. 4) state;
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" The origin of the word risk is thought to be either the Arabic word risq or the
Latin word risicum ... [The Arabic word] has connotations of a fortuitous and
favourable outcome ... [fhe Latin word] originally referred to the challenge that
a barrier reef presents to a sailor and clearly has connotations of an equally
fortuitous but unfavourable event."

Ansell et al. (1992, p 4) believe that in English usage the word has very negative
connotation such as" you run the risk of..." or" ... at risk." For example, the
Australian Oxford Dictionary (1988, p. 401) defines risk as;" [the] possibility of
meeting danger or suffering harm ... "

Therefore as Ansell et al. (1992, p. 4) state;

"Clearly over time and in common usage the meaning of the word has changed
from one of simply describing any unintended or unexpected outcome, good or
bad ... to undesirable outcomes and the chance of their occurrence."

One could argue therefore that risk has now taken on a negative form, and this form
would seem to be evident in a security context, as security professionaJs are dealing
with risk as an unfavourable occurrence.

Westhuizen ( 1990, p. 36) however makes reference to both positive and negative risk,
in the fonn of speculative and pure risk. Speculative risk is a risk which will either
result in a gain or a loss if the risk is realised; for example, the trading of shares on the
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stock market. Pure risk however will, if realised, result in either a loss or a no loss
situation. Examples of pure risk include fire, flooding, theft, industrial espionage,
sabotage and fraud.

However it is important to note the term, 'if realised'. Blades (1996, p. I) defines risk
as; " the possible occurrence of an undesirable event, or the uncertainty of financial
loss." The key words in this definition are "possible occurrence" and ..uncertainty".

As Foster (1995/96,72) points out;

" If there is no uncertainty then knowledge exists. If knowledge about the future
exists then we have a deterministic environment- for example:" you will die".
This is deterministic - certain. This is not risk; it is a fact. Thus regardless of
how you define risk, it must incorporate an element of uncertainty."

Therefore from a security viewpoint, when one refers to risk, one more commonly
refers to possible, uncertain occurrences that will cause no financial gain, but some
degree of hann. However, and while many security professionals do not appear to be
taking advantage of this, it is becoming increasingly important to view security risk in
a speculative sense. Dalton ( 1989) highlights this when he argues that the security
function must take on a more competitive, value added role within the organisation,
that the 'corporate cop' image be disbanded and security become more economically
accountable. Security risk must be viewed as an opportunity to add to the financial
performance of the organisation. While the security event itself (theft, fraud or fire)

15

Security Decay : The erosion of effective security

will not produce an opportunity for financial gain, the implementing of security to
negate these risk events will (Jones, 1994, p. 96).

Security's ability to generate profit through the practicing of risk management is
appropriately outlined by Toft (1997, p. 89) in Figure 3.

.......
Coot

Predicted cost ol
risks with control

~~J_----J_------------------~~~~~--- ~me

Figure 3: Risk Management's ability to generate profit

The figure 3 shows that by expending resources on the controlling of risk, so long as
the cost of the resources combined with the cost of the remaining risk is less than the
cost of the original risk, then the provision of security countenneasures will provide
for a profit.

The reason why risk itself must be given due consideration is because of the nature
and relationship between risk and security. Any security related research must include
acknowledgment of the influence risk has upon security. The relationship between
risk and security decay is found in the perception of security risk and the assessment
and management of risk and decay.

16
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The way in which people perceive their level of risk exposure will influence the
decisions they make. Robbins, Waters- Marsh, Cacioppo and Millet (1994, p. 163)
define perception as: " a process by which individuals organise and interpret their
sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their environment." If the security
program in place is effectively reducing the level of risk exposure the organisation
faces. the staff and management may perceive their environment as having no security
risk present. This perception may lead to apathy.

Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner and Gibson (1992, p. 101) upon discussing risk
perception argue that there are two types of risk; "dread risk" and "unknown risk".
Unknown risk refers to the degree of familiarity towards the risk. If security is
effectively reducing risk to such an extent that no threats are occurring, then the risk
becomes unknown or unfamiliar and the perception of the risk changes accordingly. In
this instance, one may be unfamiliar with the risk and therefore one could argue,
perceiving that there is no present danger. This perception of the risk may again lead
to apathy.

Tversky and Kahneman (1982) outline another factor influencing the perception of
risk and therefore the degree of apathy that a person may have. This factor is known as
the "availability heuristic" (Tversky et al. 1982, p. 18). The word heuristic simply
refers to a judgmental rule (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1982, p. 464), with
heuristics ultimately being used to simplify complex mental tasks. The availability
heuristic refers to a situation where an event which has happened more recently, or on
numerous occasions, will be more mentally available to a person. In - effect events
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(including security events) that are more easily recalled by a person will be considered
more often than events, which are not, even to a point where events that are not easily
recalled are ignored.

In the decay context, a lack of security incidents will result in the person having a 'low

level of availability'; they will not recall security incidents and therefore not consider
them. This may result in the person giving little consideration to security and
effectively becoming apathetic towards it.

The elements of cultural theory, as outlined by Wartofsky (1986), will be another
factor influencing the way in which a person perceives risk. Wartofsky (1986) argues
that peoples' cultural surroundings will influence them to see risk in a certain manner.
Cultural influences are derived from the value system within which the person resides
and values, one can argue, are "socially constituted, socially learned and socially
enforced" (Wartofsky, 1986, p. 131). The culture within the organisation may be one
in which the need to comply with security policy is non - existent. The organisation
may have a very weak security culture which will influence the degree of apathy
towards the provision of security.

The security professional must practice risk management in an organisation. The
Australian I New Zealand Standard on Risk Management (AS 4360: 1995) defines risk
management as the;
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"... systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to
the tasks of identifying, analysing, assessing, treating and monitoring risk."

Without practicing risk management, it will be unknown as to whether the cause of
security incidence is due to security decay, unsuitable security countermeasures, a
changing threat environment and so on. This is because a reactive approach to security
will see decisions made without analysis. If risk management is practiced, all variables

will be assessed. If risk management is practiced and decay is attributable, then the
resulting management decision will be more appropriate and less costly.

The accuracy of the risk analysis is also an issue. As Broder (1984, p. 2) states;

"[risk analysis] ... is a method for estimating the anticipated or expected loss
from the occurrence of some adverse event. The key word here is estimating,
because risk analysis will never be an exact science."

As a result of risk analysis being at best an estimation of the condition, one must
always be wary of the results.

The risk management process consists of completing a risk analysis and then
projecting the level of protection on the risk analysis results. However if this level of
protection turned out to be higher than needed, the effect between the next review may
be a decay of security countermeasures. The reason for this is because an over

emphasis of security will only cause security to be seen as unnecessary.
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Therefore a delicate balance must be struck between the minimal and maximum
security countermeasures needed. Too little security may result in high risk
materialisation, while too much security may result in decay leading to risk
materialisation.

Broder (1984, p. 41) correctly states that one step in the risk management process is
the conducting of a security survey. One of the aims of the security survey is to
determine the vulnerabilities that exist within the organisation. Fites and Kratz (1993,
p. 53) describe a vulnerability as a security weakness which does not in itself cause
damage but is a condition that will aid threat occurrence. Security decay is an example
of a vulnerability. Security decay will provide a condition that will aid threat
occurrence, as although security measures are in place, they are no longer operating to
their intended level of effectiveness.

Security Decay Literature

As has been stated, the security decay term was first used by Underwood (1989) in his
book "The Security of Buildings." The following reference to security decay is the
most prominent. Underwood (1989, p. 249) states that;

"The provision of effective security is paradoxically, the first step towards
decay. This is because the effective system will not only repel successful
attacks, but will also prevent the attacks being made; the illusion is thus
created that the security is unnecessary and decay will follow until the degree
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of security falls to the point at which the attack succeeds. In such cases the
immediate reaction is often to increase the original security measures
established, but in fact this is not usually necessary and all that may be
required is the re - establishment of the intended level of protection."

Apart from Underwood's (1989) reference to decay, although the remaining literature
does not specifically discuss the concept of security decay, there is literature on decay
with reference to maintenance and on other factors which may lead to an erosion of
security such as complacency and overconfidence.

Maintenance and Decay
The principle of decay has been proposed by Howlett ( 1995) upon presenting a paper
on maintenance issues with regards to security systems to the 1995 International
Carnahan Conference on Security Technology. Howlett (1995, p. 223) argues that
maintenance should not be left for too long a period as the system will deteriorate to
an unacceptable level. Howlett (1995) illustrates this maintenance issue in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 : Maintenance and Decay

The figure 5 below has been adapted from the previous diagram from Howlett (1995)
to include security tenninology which presents the security decay theory in graphical
format.

A: Security Measure Implementation

A

Security

B: Threat Occurrence

Time

Figure 5 : Security decay in graphical format
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Security Decay and Complacency
In regards to complacency, Nossiter (1993, pp. 1 - 6) stated in an interview with a

prominent security consultant that; "There's danger in complacency about the
possible threats from terrorists at the 2000 Olympic Games ..." Adams (1996, p. 4041) stated, in an article on Qantas and security, that;" Australia's official terrorist
threat to airports and airliners is currently low, but there's no room for
complacency ... " Also Gips (1996, p. 51) upon discussing security issues within CNN
stated that;" ... the bureau has recently switched guard service companies because the
officers were becoming too familiar with personnel and too complacent ... "

While it is important for security professionals to be aware of complacency, it must be
stressed that there is a difference between complacency and security decay.
Complacency can result when security measures are both poor or adequate, security
decay on the other hand, can only occur when security is effective as it is the
effectiveness of security that is postulated to cause decay. Security decay is to be
viewed in a specific, theoretical context.

Overconfidence and Security Decay
Purpura (1991, p. 123) in discussing how a person was able to penetrate White House
security stated that;

"Did the Secret Service believe its protection measures were impenetrable?
Perhaps this thinking allowed security to defeat itself. Indeed a false sense of
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security can leave an organisation open to serious and unexpected
vulnerabilities. Security practitioners can develop a feeling of invulnerability
and overconfidence in their actions and plans."

If personnel within the organisation become over confident with the effectiveness of

the implemented security countermeasures, they are indeed likely to become apathetic.
While over confidence may result in an erosion or decaying of security, this effect is
different from that which is postulated in the security decay theory. The security decay
theory is specifically concerned with the effect an effective security program has on
the behaviour of personnel towards it. It is postulated by the theory that apathy is a
result of effective security preventing threat occurrence.

Methodology Literature

In the conducting of a research study, it is important to draw upon literature relating to

various methodological issues one may encounter.

The study focused upon collecting and analysing peoples attitudes to selected
elements of the security decay theory. Therefore, the method used must be one which
is suitable for the measurement of attitudes.
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Likert tests

It has been stated by Keats (1988, p. 258) that attitude measurement began with the
development of scale values by Thurstone who discovered that by using scale
measurements, it was possible to collect both negative and positive attitudes on a
particular subject. Following Thurstones' work, Likert proposed that;

"the methods which had been previously been developed for constructing
objective tests of cognitive abilities could be applied to the construction and
use of scales for measuring attitudes" (Keats, 1988, p. 258).

Dane (1990, p. 272) defines the Likert scale in the following manner;

"The Likert scale consists of items reflecting extreme positions on a
continuum, items with which people are likely to either agree or disagree."

The development and administration of Likert tests has been discussed by many
authors (Keats, 1988, p. 258; Anderson, 1988, p. 427; Lin, 1976, p. 183; Best, 1981,
p. 181; Payne, 1974, p. 189; Lewin, 1979, p. 159; Dane, 1990, p. 272; Thorndike and
Hagen, 1969, p. 414; Bordens and Abbott, 1988, p. 174; and Hopkins, Stanley and
Hopkins, 1990, p. 293). These authors argue that by using a Likert scale, one can
generate quantitative data on attitudes. This is achieved by constructing a set of both
positive and negative statements and then directing the respondent to endorse the
statement based on a given set of response options, typically strongly agree, agree, not
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sure, disagree and strongly disagree. Depending on either the favourable or
unfavourable position of the statement (either positive or negative) a numerical value
is given. For example, responses marked strongly agree may be scaled with a value of
five and progressively scaled to a score of one for strongly disagree. These
quantitative data can then be used to estimate the attitudes of the respondents.

Likert scales are not without disadvantages. Lewin (1979) highlights one problem by
arguing that the response options may mean different things to different respondents.
Lewin (1979, p. 163) states that" what does strongly approve as used in the Likert
scale mean to Fred, as compared with what it means to Jack or Betty." For example,
strongly approve to one respondent may lean more towards approve than it does for
another who may indeed strongly approve of the statement.

Another disadvantage of the Likert scale, as outlined by Lin (1976, p. 185) is that it
does not give the respondents the opportunity to express the degree of intensity to
which they feel they either agree or disagree. The Likert scale assumes that all
responses given are done so with the same intensity. There is also the possibility, as
Best (1981, p. 185) outlines, that people will mark the response option they think
should be marked instead of that which they really believe.

Thorndike eta!. (1988, p. 415) argue that a very significant problem with attitude
scales is that "they operate purely on a verbal level. The individual doesn't do
anything to back up his stated attitude."
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While the Likert scale method does have disadvantages, there are a number of
advantages in using such a scale. Lin (1976, p. 183) states that the Likert test method
is general enough to be applied to a wide range of variables, therefore being suitable
for the study. Dane (1990, p. 272) indicates that using a Likert scale is significantly
less labour intensive and time consuming. Payne (1974, p. 189) argues that the
attraction to the Likert scale is because it is less complex than other methods, but as
Lewin (1979, p. 159) points out, the results derived from a Likert scale are just as
accurate. This is because Likert himself completed the same stuUy using both the
Thurstone and Likert methods and produced identical results.

In developing a Likert test, Anderson (1988, p. 427) and Lin (1976, p. 184-185)

believe that the following steps should be undertaken;

(a) Construct statements which are both favourable and unfavourable.

(b) Judges from a sample of the population going to test are used to determine
whether the statements are favourable, unfavourable or neither.

(c) Those statements not classified by the majority of the judges as either
favourable or unfavourable are eliminated.

(d) Remaining statements are presented in random order.

(e) This initial version of the test is administererl to a sample population.
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(f) The correlation between the total scores and the individual statements are

computed.

(g) Each statement whose correlation with the total score is not statistically
significant may be eliminated. This procedure is referre~ to as Likert's
criterion of internal consistency.

(h) The final version of the test is prepared.

These steps are included as they are necessary for the Likert test to be constructed
correctly, in order for the best possible results to be achieved.

Sampling

Best (1981, p. 8) points out that the study of an entire population is impractical, if not
impossible. Lin (1976, p. 146) states that a population is " ... the total group of cases
which conform to certain designated set of specifications. In this case the populations
involved are professional security people and people with no security expertise. As it
is not possible to study the entire population, samples of the population must be used.
A sample is a " ... small proportion of a population selected for observation and
analysis" (Best, 1981, p.8).
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As it is not the intention of the study to generalise with regards to the security decay
theory across both the expert and non - expert security population, then nonprobability
sample methods were judged sufficient.

Lin (1976, p. 157) states that nonprobability sampling methods are suitable when
generalisations of results across a population are not required. It is highlighted by Lin
(1976, p. 157) and Best ( 1981, p. 13) that nonprobability sampling methods will not
produce results that can be attributable across the population, but will provide results
that can only be generalised across the specific sample group. Lin (1976, p. 187) states
that;

"Nonprobability samples may be useful in providing the researcher with
insight or a general idea of what is happening in the population, but they are
not scientific reflections of the population itself."

Lin (1976, p. 157) presents a number of nonprobability sampling methods of which
"Purposive Sampling" was believed to be the most appropriate for the study.

Lin (1976, p. 158) describes the purposive sampli•'g method as one which;" ...
involves the use of judgement on the part of the researcher. He forms his sample by
selecting cases he thinks are representative of the population."
Purposive sampling is believed to be a viable sampling method when the boundaries
of the population under examination are impossible to define and when time and
facilities available are limited (Lin, 1976, p. 158).
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In regards to sample size, it is argued by Lewin, (I 979, p. I 88) that a smaller

population can be represented by a small sample, and that even though a population
size may increase. the increase in the requisite sample size is not proportional. The
population for this study is small, therefore a small sample size is sufficient.

Validity

Hopkins et al. (I 990), Zeller (I 988), Payne (1974) and Lewin (1979) all state that
validity is a concept that relates to whether or not the study conducted actually
measures what it intended to measure. For example, Lewin (1979) argues that;" A
measure is valid if it really measures what it is supposed to measure." Shaughnessy

and Zechmeister (1985, p. 15) point out that"... validity refers to the truthfulness of a
measure. A valid measure is one that measures what it claims to measure."

Lewin (1979, p. 78) argues that one way of determining validity is by "face validity."
Face validity refers to the self-evident nature of the validity of the test and may be

gained through expert scrutineering of the test.

Reliability

Reliability refers to the consistency of the test. Lin (1976, p. 168) states that a measure
will be reliable if it generates similar responses on every subsequent usage. Lewin

(1979, p. 77) describes reliability as the extent to which the method of measurement
produces the same results under the same conditions.
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When discussing validity and reliability, one important point must be noted, a test
method can be reliable, but not necessarily valid (Hopkins et al. 1990. p. 113; and
Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 1985, p. 15). An example to illustrate this point is given
by Shaughnessy et al. (1985, p. 15) when they state that;

" ... subjects whose intelligence was being tested might be able to perform
consistently (reliably) on a balancing task, but there is serious questions about
the validity of this measure of intelligence."
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CHAPTER3
The Study
To thoroughly examine the concept of security decay, one would be required to
conduct a longitudinal study which can be defined as the " ... examining of a
population over a prolonged period of time" (Payne, 1974, p. 201). Such a
longitudinal study could take the fonn of a researcher located within an organisation
for a prolonged period of time and constantly assessing the effectiveness of security,
degrees of apathy towards its provision and the effect that this has on the operational
effectiveness of security. However, this investigation does not pennit a longitudinal
study, therefore the gathering and assessment of the attitudes to specific aspects of the
security decay theory were sought.

Sample and Subject Selection

The attitudes of two distinct samples were sought which include professional security
specialists and non - security persons. This stratification of sample was required as the
non- security person's represent those that are instructed, influenced and operate
within the security guidelines. It is the non- security persons that will, if at all,
become apathetic towards security. Therefore, the test concerned with whether or not
effective security causes apathy will be directed at this sample.
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It must be assumed that the security specialist will have an understanding of the
security decay concept, how effective security functions and whether apathy will
cause security to decay. This is because it is the security specialist who construct the
security programs and monitor their effectiveness.

It was believed that for the study, the nonprobability purposive sampling method
would suffice. The population of what one may call a "security specialist" is
ambiguous. There are people operating within the security field whose claim to expert
status is not without some concern. There are people whose occupation requires them
to conduct security, as well as other tasks and it is assumed that these people are not
security specialists. With regards to non -security personnel, how does one define this
population? As has already been stated, the security specialist population is
ambiguous, so where is the line drawn discriminating the security expert from the
ignorant?

For the purposes of the study, a non -security person was defined as someone who
has no direct responsibility for security and who is influenced or 'controlled' by
security policy and procedure during the course of their daily routine business
activities.

The security specialist population consisted of those persons who have a direct
responsibility for security, either in a managerial, consultative or advisory role.
Formal security training and education was not a prerequisite where considerable
experience was evident.
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The purposive sampling method was used in the study, as it was believed that cases
could be chosen from the population that would provide for an appropriate sample. As
a result of this sampling method being used, it will not be argued that the attitudes
evaluated will reflect those of the wider security and non- security populations.

A security specialist sample size of around fifteen was deemed achievable and a
similar non - security sample was also sought.

Instrumentation
The instrument used to assess the attitudes and perceptions from which interpretation
could be made was in the form of a Likert test. Three Likert tests were constructed
and administered to the specified sample groups where each test, Test 1 part A and B

(Appendix A and B) and Test 2 (Appendix C) related to the three research questions.
A positive or negative position (relative to the decay theory) was taken with each
statement, with positive and negative statements being presented in a random order. A
negative statement was one, which was in contradiction with the theory, and a positive
statement was one, which was aligned with the theory. The negative or positive
polarities of these statements will determine the numerical ratings for each item.

The response options of strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree and strongly disagree
were utilised. The number scale ranged from 5-1 (on a positively framed statement)
and from 1 - 5 (on a negatively framed statement). For example, if the statement was

positive, then strongly agree would equal 5, agree would equal4, not sure would equal
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3 and so on. Therefore, the higher the numerical value, the more the attitude is one of
agreement.

Procedure

The three Likert tests were developed so that a pilot study could be conducted. Upon
completing the construction of the Likert tests (before they were distributed to the
pilot sample), validity of the tests was evaluated.

Validity of the Likert test statements was examined through the face validity me.hod.
Associate Professor Cliff Smith conducted the examination and came to the
conclusion that the tests would satisfactorily fulfil their functional requirements and
had face validity for their proposed function and application (Appendix D).

Upon completing the validation process, the pilot study was then conducted.

Pilot Study

The Security Specialist Test (Test I) Part A consisted of 47 statements and Part B
consisted of 12 statements. These two tests were completed by three people from the
security specialist sample.

The Security Effectiveness Test (Test 2) consisted of 17 statements. This test was
completed by three people who matched the description of non- security people.
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As a result of the low number of respondents completing the pilot study. the ability to
accurately assess each statement was reduced. However those statements which did
not appear to be consistent were identifiable. This was achieved by summing the total
score for each statement, and those statements with a score which was extremely
dissimilar to the others was eliminated.

Also, those statements eliciting a variety of responses (for example, responses of both
strongly agree and strongly disagree), it will be argued in the majority of cases, could
be justifiably included in the final test version. A small number of statements elicited
varying responses and were eliminated as a result of this scrutiny.

A discussion of the pilot study results will be presented, with the results of the pilot
study in Appendix E.

Security Specialist Test- Test 1 (Part A)

Test 1 (Part A) was developed to attempt to evaluate what may constitute an effective
security program.

Below is an outline of those statements which warranted further analysis before they
were either eliminated or used in the final test version. Those statements that did not
warrant further analysis will not be discussed.
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Statement 3 :

The responses to this statement were extreme enough to warrant
further analysis. However are- wording of the statement would
modify it to a point that would justify its inclusion in the final
version of the test. The statement included the word vital; that a
certain function is 'vital' to effective security. A response of
disagree was brought about because of the strong nature of this
word. The word 'vital' was changed to the word 'important'.

Statement 7 :

Although there was a variation in response options chosen
(two SD, one A), this statement was included in the final test
version as it was thought that the statement was misinterpreted in
the pilot study. However, the statement was re-phrased to provide
clarity of intent to the test subjects.

Statement 9 :

There was a variation in response options chosen for this statement
due to a misinterpretation. The statement was re - phrased to provide
clarity.

Statement l 0 :

This statement was thought to be misinterpreted. The statement was
fairly long and as a result, was re - phrased.

Statement 16:

This statement was classified as a positive statement which elicitt!d
all negative responses. This resulted in an inconsistent statement
score and was therefore removed from the final test version.
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Statement 18 :

This statement elicited responses of agree, disagree and not
sure. However instead of eliminating it from the final test
version, it was presented as two separate statements.

Statement 19:

This statement was misinterpreted and subsequently resulted in a
modification of the statement.

Statement 26 :

This statement was also misinterpreted. However this statement was
necessary in ensuring that the aim of the test was achieved.

Statement 33 :

Although three different response options were chosen, (with two
leaning towards agreement), and because of the small number of
pilot study participants, it was thought that such a circumstance
should result in the statement being included in the final test
version.

Statement 35 :

Although one response option was Not Sure (NS), the others
indicated a degree of agreement. For this reason the statement was
included in the final test version.

Statement 42 :

This statement was misinterpreted but the subject matter of this
statement was needed to be included. This resulted in the statement
being re - phrased and included in the final test version.
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Statement 47 :

The responses indicated that this statement was poorly constructed.
Although it was included in the final test, extensive modification
was undertaken to alleviate respondent's difficulties.

Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2

Test 2 was develc.ped in order to examine whether the respondents thought that
effective security was achievable, that this state of security would cause a lack of
security incidence, and that an environment lacking in security breaches would cause
decay.

Statement 3 :

This statement was designed with positive polarity. However it
elicited negative responses. This made it inconsistent and resulted in
its removal for the final version of the test.

Statement 7 :

Although this statement elicited varying responses, this statement is
of considerable importance to the study. The statement is concise
and modification will bring about no benefit. For this reason, the
statement was included in the final version of the test.

Statement 12 :

This statement was inconsistent as a result of its positive
construction and negative response, and was therefore eliminated.
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Security Specialist Test- Test 1 (Part B)

This test was developed in order to assess the security specialist respondent's
perceptions towards whether or not apathetic attitudes to security would cause security
to decay, or reduce in effectiveness.

Statement 2 :

This statement was misinterpreted but because of its critical
importance to the study, it was included in the final test version.

As a result of the pilot study, there were three omissions of statements with statement
16 in the Security Specialists Test- Test I part A, and statements 3 and 12 in The
Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2. There were also a number of modifications of
statements that were included in the final version of the test.

The pilot study was a valuable facet of the study as it allowed those statements that
were unsuitable for whatever reasons, to be evaluated and either modified or
eliminated.

Reliability of the Likert tests was addressed through the conducting of the pilot study.
The pilot study allowed any inconsistent statements to be omitted. Statements were
deemed inconsistent when their total score varied significantly from other statement
scores. Upon completion of the pilot study, three statements were omitted as their
scores varied significantly.
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After the pilot study, the final version tests were developed, with the appropriate
modifications made. As the final test versions were being developed, the researcher
identified those people who would be suitable and likely to be willing to participate in
the study. These people were identified through professional security management
societies.

The respondent's chosen were contacted by telephone to detennine if they were
willing to participate. The majority of participants contacted agreed to participate, and
arrangements were made to either visit them at their place of work to complete the
tests, or to mail or facsimile the test to them. This procedure required them to return
the test through similar means.

The targeted participants were those representing the security specialist sample. In
order to collect completed tests from the non- security sample, certain members of the
security specialist sample were requested to pass on the Security Effectiveness TestTest 2, to people within their organisation who had no direct security responsibility,
but were influenced by security initiatives. This allowed for easier access to both
subjects and ensured that those completing the test were in fact influenced by security
initiatives.

With the final version tests completed and returned, the data analysis phase of the
study commenced.
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Data Analysis
The data were analysed in a four part process, with each of the three individual test
results being outlined and interpreted, and then being discussed in relation to the
theory as a whole. This four step process resulted from each test addressing one of the
variables of the section of the security decay theory under examination. Each variable
had to be assessed individually, before being assessed in relation to the theory.
The Security Specialist Test- Test l examined the concept of effective security and as
such, was divided into specific categories (called sub- concepts) for analysis. This
was done as an effective security program will consist of many elements. Effective
security may include some aspects and not others, therefore each was highlighted
individually.

The Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 focused on the relationship between effective
security and apathy and it)oo required categorical analysis. The reason why this test
was divided into sub - concepts was because each sub - concept had to be present
before the other could be attributed. That is, if the respondents did not believe
effective security was achievable, then they could not have thought effective security
would cause a lack of security incidents.

The third test, the Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part B was concerned solely on
whether or not apathy will cause a reduction in effectiveness and therefore no further
categorisation was required.

42

Security Decay : The erosion of effective security

For each test, and those tests requiring categorical analysis, the summated sub concept mean score was given, as well as total concept mean scores. This process
allowed the prevailing attitude from within the sample population to be considered.

Following the outlining of the study results, analysis and outcome detenninations
were undertaken which addressed each of the test results and how they related to the
security decay theory.

Limitations
A limitation of the study is the inability to generalise outcomes, which is a result of
the sampling method utilised. The attitudes assessed in the study will not necessarily
reflect those of the broader security and non -security population. This limitation can
be overcome by conducting representative random sampling, as well as collecting a
larger sample size, which was not fe,sible for this study. It was deemed sufficient to
collect a representative sample, which would provide an indication of the prevailing
attitude within both populations.

Another limitation of the study is that it provides no proof that effective security is
achievable or that effective security will cause apathy and that apathy will cause
decay. That is, there will be no conclusive evidence supporting the hypothesis. To be
able to demonstrate evidence of the existence or lack of existence of security decay, a
longitudinal study must be undertaken.
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Also the Security Specialist Test - Test l, will not provide a theoretical basis for ao
evaluation of whether security is effective or not; that is, one could not argue that
effective security specifically consists of the concepts under examination in the test.
The concepts are present in the test solely because they were included by the
researcher, and would not constitute all factors necessary for security to be effective.
Add to this the notion that security is a very flexible phenomenon and what may
indeed be effective at one facility may not at another. This results from a multitude of
factors including facility location, industry type, crime demographics, business
operations of neighbouring facilities and so on. Ultimately, each facility will have
differing levels of risk exposure, requiring differing levels of security. Therefore, the
Security Specialist Test- Test 1 will only provide an indication as to what may be
included in an effective security program.

-----------------------------------------«
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CHAPTER4
Study Results
The measurement process consisted of three Likert tests. A Likert test (Security
Specialist Test- Test I part A) was administered to the security specialist sample,
addressing the research question, What constitutes effective security? Thus the total
concept score for this test relates to what constitutes effective security.

This test was also divided into a number of categories that represent aspects within a
security function that may enable security to become, if implemented and
implemented correctly, effective. The sub- concepts included;

(a) Management of the Security Function
(b) Awareness I Education

(c) Application of Security Theory
(d) fuvestigation I futelligence

(e) Measuring Effectiveness
(f) Legal Aspects

(g)

Professi.'}:,~lism

of rhe Security Manager

Each of these sub - concepts were tested, enabling a sub concept score to be
determined. This sub - concept score enabled the sub - concept to be analysed, and
then assessed in relation to the total concept.
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The second Likert test (Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2) was administered to the
non - security sample addressing the research question; Does effective security cause
an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security? This test was also divided into
sub - concepts and included;

(a) Effective security is an achievable state
(b) Effective security causes a lack of security incidence
(c) A lack of security incidence causes apathy

This categorisation was necessary as to gauge the respondents' attitude to this
concept, the respondents attitude towards whether effective security is achievable had
to be detennined, as well as whether or not this causes a lack of security incidents,
resulting in apathy.

The third Likert test (Security Specialist Test- Test I part B) was also administered to
the security specialist sample addressing the research question; Does an apathetic
attitude towards the provision of security cause a decaying of security? This research
question consisted of the only concept under examination within this test

Security Specialist Test - Test 1 Part A

The sub- concept and total concept mean scores for the Security Specialist Test- Test
I Part A are as follows;
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IMan~gement of the security

4.23

functmn

IAwareness I Education

4.53

IApplication of Security Theory

4.33

I Investigation I Intelligence

3.76

I Measuring Effectiveness

4.53

I Legal Aspects

4.58

Professionalism of the Security
Manager

ITotal Concept Score

4.18

4.30

Table 1: Sub- concept and Total concept scores for Security Specialist Test- Test I Part A

The 'management of the security function' sub - concept consisted of numerous
management issues such as risk management, financial aspects, the management of
people, technology and infonnation and the management of the integration of security
into the organisation. The mean score (N; 15) for this sub- concept (4.23) resided
between agree (numerical value of 4) and strongly agree (numerical value of 5),
indicating that the respondents believed that management considerations such as those
included are of significant importance.
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The 'awareness and education' sub- concept highlighted the importance of educating
and communicating the security message. The mean score for this sub- concept (4.53)
resided between agree and strongly agree which indicates that awareness and
education programs should be included for security to be effective.

The mean score for the 'application of security theory' sub- concept (4.33) resided
between agree and strongly agree, indicating that when ensuring security is effective,
one should consider applying relevant security theory.

The sub- concept mean score for 'investigation I intelligence' (3.76) resided between
not sure (numerical value of 3) and agree (numerical value of 4). This would indicate
that the respondents were indecisive as to the importance of these to a security
function. This may have resulted from the combining of the two into one concept, as
some of the respondents may have thought one was important and the other not so.
This may also have resulted from the respondent's personal use of investigations and
intelligence, or lack thereof.

The 'measuring effectiveness' sub- concept was concerned with the need to set a
measure of effectiveness for security, that security must have a criterion on which to
judge its perfonnance. The mean score for this sub- concept (4.53) resided between
agree and strongly agree indicating that the respondents agreed with the need to set an
effectiveness standard.
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The sub- concept mean score for 'legal aspects' (4.58) resided between agree and
strongly agree. This would suggest that the respondents agreed with the need to take
into consideration legal aspects when providing an effective security function.

The sub - concept 'professionalism of the security manager' was concerned with the
levels of integrity a security manager must uphold, including their personal history.
The mean score for this sub- concept (4.18) resided between agree and strongly agree,
indicating the respondent's agreement with such levels of professionalism

Each sub- concept is to be equally weighted, with no sub- concept being more
important than the other. A summated combination of these sub- concepts resulted in
the total concept score. The total concept score (4.30) resided between agree and
strongly agree indicating that the respondents believe the sub- concepts will be
necessary elements of an effective security program.

Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2
The sub -concept and total concept mean scores for the Security Effectiveness TestTest 2 are as follows;

Effective security is an achievable
state

3.92

Effective security causes a lack of
security incidence

3.69

A lack of security incidence causes
apathy

3.26
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I Total Concept Score

3.62

Table 2: Sub- concept and Total concept scores for Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2

The first sub -concept under examination within this test posed the question; is
effective security an achievable state? The mean score (N = 12) for this sub- concept
(3.92) resided between not sure and agree, leaning towards agree however. This result
would suggest the respondents were indecisive with this sub -concept, however one
may argue that they believe, albeit tentatively, that security can reach an effective
state.

The sub -concept concerned with whether effective security causes a lack of security
incidence resulted in a mean score between not sure and agree (3.69). This would
suggest that the respondents were not sure as to whether this would be the case or not.

The third sub- concept within this test focused upon whether the respondents thought
that a lack of security incidence causes an attitude of apathy. The mean score for the
sub- concept (3.26) resided between not sure and agree. The indication therefore is
that the respondents were unsure as to whether an environment where there was little
or no threat occurrence would result in one becoming apathetic.

The total concept score (3.62) resided between not sure and agree. The overriding
indication is that the respondents were indecisive to this concept. It could be argued
that the respondents were either unsure as to whether effective security causes a lack
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of security incidence and that a lack of security incidence causes an attitude of apathy.
Therefore the respondents did not disagree with these possibilities, nor did they agree,
which in effect, provides inconclusive data.

Security Specialist Test • Test 1 Part B

The total concept score for the Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part B is as follows;

IApathy causes decay

4.31

I Total Concept Score

4.31

Table 3 : Total concept scores for Security Specialist Test - Test I Part A

There was only one concept under examination within this test. The mean score for
the concept (4.31) resided between agree and strongly agree indicating that the
respondents believe that an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security will
cause security to decay.
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CHAPTERS
Analysis and Interpretations
From the test results presented in the previous chapter, the analysis and interpretations
phase will now follow. Each of the three tests and their sub- concepts (where
applicable) will be analysed and interpreted, with the aim of providing an indication
as to relevance and likelihood of the existence of the security decay theory.

Security Specialist Test- Test I Part A

All of the sub -concepts within the Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part A would
appear to be important to a security function striving for effectiveness. Although no
weighting was given to the sub -concepts during development and testing, each
derived reasonably similar mean scores (except for the investigation I intelligence sub
-concept). This result would suggest that the implementing and managing of an
effective security function requires the inclusion of many varied elements, providing a
synergistic effect.

While this may indeed be true, is one sub- concept more significant than another
when providing an effective security function? An assessment of the mean scores
shows that the 'legal aspects' sub- concept derived the highest score (4.58) from
within the sample, but is this deserving of the highest score? Ensuring compliance
with legislation, documenting policy and procedures and reducing the likelihood of
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negligence suits are all legal issues which must certainly be addressed, but if one was
to state security's core business, would legal compliance be it?

Within the 'management of the security function' sub - concept were issues such as;
integrating security's influence into all organisational departments, financial
management of the security function, managing the relevance of people, technology
and information, and risk management.

The researcher would argue that it is risk management that will 'represent' a security
function's core business and therefore, will be of the greatest significance. Although
the 'management of the security function' sub - concept derived a lower mean score
than others, this could be attributed to the merging of the integration, financial,
technology, people and infonnation issues into the sub- concept. In order for the subconcept to receive a high mean score, all respondents would needed to have strongly
agreed with all issues, and one could argue that the greater the number of issues
within a sub- concept, the less likely it is that one would agree significantly with it.

The statements within the 'management of the security function' sub- concept
concerned directly with risk management produced results, which can be seen in
Table 4.
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Statement

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

9.
10.
16.
17.
18.

Mean Score
4.73
4.80
4.67
4.20
4.47
4.47
4.00
4.53
4.00
4.27
3.80
3.67

Table 4: Mean statement scores for statements relating to risk management within the 'management of
the security function' sub - concept.

The summated mean score for risk management relevant statements was 4.30. This
score resides between agree and strongly agree indicating that the respondents believe
that risk management is an important component of effective security. However
compared with other sub- concepts, it ranks relatively low. The reason for this would
appear to have resulted from the low mean scores for statements 17 and 18.

Statement 17 reads as " a security function which reduces identified threat
consequence will be deemed effective" and statement 18 reads as "a security function
which reduces identified threat frequency will be deemed effective." There would
appear to be indecision as to the importance of reducing threat frequency and
consequence from within the sample. The researcher would argue that for security to
be effective, threat frequency must be reduced, as well as the consequences of any
threat occurrence. It is possible that some of the respondents did not take the
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statement at face value; that is, they read more into the statement than was expected.
Yes a security program which only reduces threat frequency will not be effective, but
the statements were not referring to frequency or consequence in isolation.

The reason why risk management should be the over riding factor in ensuring a
security function is effective is because of the role a security function is tasked to
perform. Security's role is to reduce the level of risk an organisation is exposed to, via
numerous methods, to a level which the organisation is willing to accept. The !isk
management process, which can be argued to include the following components; asset
identification, threat identification, vulnerability assessment, risk analysis (threat
consequence multiplied by probability), risk treatment options and treatment option
implementation and review, will allow the security function to specifically identify
those risks which are not acceptable, and effectively and efficiently reduce their
probability of occurrence and consequence.

Indeed Elbra (1992) highlights the importance of risk management when outlining the
options in which a security function could operate. Elbra ( 1992, p. 27) argues that
there are four basic approaches to security which are;

- to invest all the security devices that are available

- habitually react to the latest scare

- to patch up holes as they appear or;
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to carry out a risk management exercise.

It is obvious that the first three methods alone do not provide for an efficient and

effective security program, as Elbra (1992, p. 27) states" ... the result [would] be
islands of security in a sea of risk." Only through the practicing of risk management
can security expenditure be consumed effectively and efficiently.

Risk management however is not often utilised, or when utilised, is done so
incorrectly. Keller (1994, p. 104) in discussing how much security is sufficient within
a museum environment, stated that; " ... all that security professionals can do is make
an educated guess based on experience." However, the practicing of risk management
involves more than merely making guesses based on experience. While experience
will significantly aid in the accuracy of any assessment and decision making, the
results of a risk assessment are derived from statistics, qualitative data such as
emerging crime trends and historical reports and the understanding of such issues as
cultural influences and heuristical biases.

The practice of risk management however is not without criticism. Toft (1997, p. 85)
states that;

" .... risk management [to some] can be envisaged as being similar to
soothsaying and prophecy; in so far as the general idea is to forecast what
potential misfortunes the future might hold for the organisation and then try to
prevent them from occurring."
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The foundation for this criticism lies in the idea that risk management does not deal in
the absolute, but in possibilities and likelihoods. Being able to predict the future is
indeed a difficult task, and while this criticism does exist, the relevance of risk
management to the provision of an effective security function must be argued to reside
in the efficiencies it allows.

Risk management will be the management tool on which the security program is
planned and developed. While its practice is of ultimate importance, it can only be
effective when combined with other factors.

The implementation of the risk management process will result in the security
manager being able to report to senior management the level of risk exposure, but how
is this level of exposure to be reduced to an acceptable level? The level of risk
exposure is reduced by outlining recommended treatment options to senior
management, who will proceed to evaluate each and determine which are to be
implemented. But what do the treatment options consist of?

The treatment options are exhaustive and consist of any countermeasure or any
process modification that will reduce risk consequence and I or probability. Indeed,
treatment options can consist of the sub- concepts within the Security Specialist Test
- Test I Part A.

In recommending treatment options and developing security countermeasure plans, it

would appear necessary to apply security theory. This is supported by the 'application

57

Security Decay : The erosion of effective security

of security theory' sub - concept which derived a high score (4.33). A security theory
may provide the manager with a greater insight into the problem, or may allow them
to address the problem in a way that has been proven to work in the past. For example,
the implementing of various countermeasures giving consideration to the defence in
depth principle.

Vlith a risk assessment completed and countermeasures implemented, the security
function will not automatically become effective. There will be an ongoing need to
'sell' the security function to the organisation because of personnel turnover and
emerging threats (Sennewald, 1985, p. 241). Also, and as Sennewald (1985, p. 241)
states;

.. Employees at all levels of the organisation must first be made aware of, then
understand, and then come to appreciate the fact that the security function is a
viable and integral part of the business ... "

This can only be achieved through constant awareness programs and education
initiatives. The sub- concept relating to this within the Security Specialist Test- Test
I Part A derived a very high score (4.53), indicating that the respondents agree with
the importance of such programs in an effective security function.

Does a security function need to undergo a process of self evaluation to become and I
or remain effective? The 'measuring effectiveness' sub- concept derived a very high
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score (4.53) indicating that the respondents did indeed believe so. But how does the
security function measure effectiveness?

One possible way to measure effectiveness is through benchmarking. O'Leary (1995,
p. 25) defines benchmarking as" ... the process of continuously measuring and
assessing products, services and practices against recognised standards." However the
problem faced in benchmarking a security function, is recognising a standard on
which to compare. One may be tempted to compare the results of one year with years
past, but will this provide a legitimate comparison? The operating environment is so
dynamic that the level of risk faced one year may be significantly greater or less from
previous years.

The researcher would argue, that in order to measure effectiveness, the security
function must first set objectives which are attainable based on the current
environment and then, after some determinable period of time, evaluate whether the
objectives have been achieved. These objectives may be categorised into financial
objectives, levels of satisfaction of security by staff and management and so forth.

Those who are tasked with ensuring the security of the organisation are placed in
positions of great trust. Therefore the integrity of the security manager must be of the
highest order. Not only that, but the security manager must have a high degree of
knowledge and some relevant experience for security to be effective. The security
manager must understand the philosophy of security and all its intricacies. Therefore,
one could argue that the professionalism of the security manager is of some
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importance. For security to be effective, it must be respected by the organisation, and
this is likely to be more forth coming if the security manager him I her self is
respected. The 'professionalism of the security manager' sub- concept derived a
reasonably high score (4.18), suggesting that the respondents agree with this need.

The 'investigation I intelligence' sub- concept provided the most surprising sub concept mean score (3.76), residing between not sure and agree. There was in effect,
two concepts under examination in relation to investigations and intelligence. Firstly,
whether they were necessary in effective security programs, and secondly how they
related to pro - activeness and reactiveness.

Statements 26 and 42 were concerned with the importance of investigations to an
effective security program, deriving mean scores of 3.80 and 3.93. This would suggest
that the sample were unsure, although leaning towards agreement.

Statements 43 and 45 were concerned with the importance of security intelligence,
deriving mean scores of 4.40 and 4.20, indicating that the respondents do consider
intelligence to be of some significance when attempting to achieve a state of effective
security.

When combining investigations and intelligence to issues of pro - activeness and
reactiveness, the sample were again indecisive. Statement 27 argued that intelligence
will provide the necessary proactive element of an effective security program and
derived a mean score of 3.60. Statement 35 argued that investigations will provide the

60

Security Decay : The erosion of effective security

necessary reactive element in an effective security program, deriving a mean score of
just 2.60, which resides between disagree (2) and not sure (3).

The researcher believes that it is the wording of statement 35 which resulted in the
low sub- concept mean score. It would be argued that investigations provide 'a'
reactive element in a security program, not 'the' reactive element. It is believed that
the respondents read the statement correctly, but that is was poorly worded and not
discovered in the pilot study.

The researcher would argue that for security to be effective, it must provide both
proactive and reactive capabilities. An inherent concept of the defence in depth
principle is redundancy. In order to provide sufficient redundancy, the security
function must be able to both prevent risk rnaterialisation as well as reacting to it. As
the elimination of security risk is unattainable, we provide infrastructures that wili
manage the crisis. Also, often upon risk materialisation, an investigation is
commissioned to determine the how and the why, and recommend ways to prevent the
event from occurring in the future. These capabilities are examples of reactionary
elements of a security function.

The most effective way of being proactive is to forward plan, to recognise events that
may occur and develop ways in which to either prevent their frequency and I or
consequence. In order to forward plan, infonnation must be coiiected and evaluated.
Information which has been evaluated is known as inteiligence and intelligence is an
important security tool because of the influence it has over planning and decision
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making. Indeed "intelligence deals with all things which should be known in advance
of initiating a course of action" (Eells and Nehemkis, 1984, p. 48). Intelligence will
provide the security manager with the information needed to make the most timely
and relevant recommendations to senior management, before an event occurs.

Therefore, should the security function strive for both reactive and proactive elements,
the researcher would argue that investigation and intelligence capabilities would fulfil
these roles. However, the data fails to support this argument conclusively.

Security Effectiveness Test - Test 2

The results of the Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 were generally inconclusive,
with the three sub- concepts all deriving mean scores between not sure and agree,
resulting in a similar total concept mean score (See Table 2).

The first concept put to the non - security sample was whether or not they believed
that effective security was an achievable state. To this they responded with a mean
score of 3.92 suggesting they were unsure, however leaning towards believing that
security could be effective.

So is effective security achievable? The researcher would argue in the affirmative
because of the plan that a correctly conducted risk management process will allow one
to develop. Such a process allows one to accurately assess threat types, frequencies
and consequences and therefore implement countermeasures to negctte these. The risk

62

Security Decay : The erosion of effective security

management process combined with new technologies and traditional management
practices all allow security to achieve a state of effectiveness.

The second concept put to the non -security sample was whether they believed that
effective seculity would cause a lack of security incidents. The mean score for this sub
-concept was 3.69, again demonstrating some indecision and ignorance from this
sample. It was argued previously that effective security will result when numerous
factors are integrated with the practicing of risk management in order for threat
occurrences to be reduced in both frequency and consequence. Therefore, if security is
effective, a reduction in incidents (frequency) will result.

The final sub- concept put to the non- security sample was whether a lack of security
incidents causes an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security. This subconcept derived a mean score of 3.26, suggesting that the respondents were not sure if
this situation would arise or not.

There were a number of ways in which the statements were put to the respondents
within this sub -concept. Some of the statements were directed at the respondents
themselves, and were then combined with concepts of perceptions of unnecessariness
towards security and experiences of security incidents.

Statements 4 and 8 were directed at the respondents themselves and stated (with

different polarities) that when the respondents perceive security as unnecessary, they
do not follow security policy and procedure. Both of these statements resulted in mean
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scores of 2.42, indicating that they disagree with this. Therefore, the respondents
believe that even though they may perceive security as unnecessary, they still comply
will all procedures. Whether or not this would be reflective of the wider population is
indeterminable.

The statements directed at the respondents themselves which dealt with the influence
a lack of security breaches experienced, had over their degree of apathy (statements 12
and 15) resulted in mean scores of 3.58 and 3.67. These mean scores suggest that the
respondents were indecisive as to whether or not their experiences of security
breaches influenced their degree of apathy. That is, the respondents could not decide
whether or not circumstances where they do not experience security breaches resulted
in them feeling apathetic towards security. The data from within the sample is
therefore inconclusive.

The researcher would argue however that if one does not experience a security
incident and is surrounded with security procedures, one would be likely to consider
the security irrelevant, thereby becoming apathetic. The theory and the researcher's
opinion are by no means arguing that this is the proper way to view security. The fact
that no incidents are occurring is because of the existence of security and it therefore
should be maintained. However the non - security people do not comprehend this (in
theory), making it the task of the security function to highlight andre- enforce the
need for security.
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Security Specialist Test- Test I Part B

There was only one concept under examination within this test. This concept was
concerned with whether or not apathy would cause a decaying or an erosion of
security effectiveness. The summated mean score for this concept was 4.31, indicating
that the respondents did indeed believe that apathetic attitudes towards security, by
people within an organisation, would cause security to decay.

This concept is primarily concerned with the issues of compliance and the reliance of
security initiatives on organisational personnel. Staff compliance with security
procedure is of paramount importance to a security function and one could argue that
without it, security will decay. This process is because of the nature of security itself.

A security function can only identify risks, develop plans to counter the risk,
implement the plan and review effectiveness. The security function can only provide a
guide, recommending ways to achieve a secure state. The security function may
indeed be able to force its message in other environments such as prisons and the
military, but generally not within the private sector.

It is the staff who require access to company spaces, it is the staff who handle monies
or valuable product and it is the staff who are trusted with confidential infonnation. In
effect, all staff are empowered with the responsibility of being company security
officers. For security to be effective, it must be a collaborative effort between those
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who are responsible for guiding the security function, the security manager and
subordinates, and those who must provide the actual security, the staff.

H the staff perceive security as irrelevant, the collaborative effort is broken, the

security function will in effect be rendered inoperable, and security may decay.

Analysis Summary
To summarize the results, one could argue that effective security will be created
through a synergistic combination of many elements including, but not limited to,
those contained in the Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part A. The elements to an
effective security function will be application specific, with the over riding element of
an effective security program being the risk management process as this will represent
a security functions core business. With elements identified and implemented, one can
argue that effective security is achievable.

The data from the non - security sample regarding whether they believe effective
security will cause apathy was inconclusive. Therefore, one can not rule out such an
effect, nor attribute apathy to effective security. The study can make no generalisable
detennination regarding this concept.

The security specialist respondents believed that apathetic attitudes towards security
would cause security to decay. This would provide a fairly strong indication with
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regards to this concept, however and again, no generalisable determination can be
made.

The likelihood and relevance of the security decay theory can be viewed in an
assessment of the component variables.

Is an organisation likely to be able to achieve a state of effective security? Through the
practicing of risk management and with the implementation of various
countermeasure strategies an organsiation will indeed be able to achieve a state of
effective security.

Does a state of effective security cause apathy through the prevention of security
breaches? The results of this study do not allow for a conclusive detennination,
however one may argue that this is indeed likely because effective security will reduce
risk materialisation. With no risk materialisation and combined with factors such as
risk perception, heuristical biases and cultural influences, people may believe that
there is no need for such a level of security, which in turn, influences their degree of
compliance with security policy and procedure.

Does an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security cause a decaying of
security? The indication to be derived from the study was that apathy would indeed
cause security effectiveness to decay.
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Therefore the researcher would argue that security decay within an organisation is
likely and therefore relevant.
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CHAPTER6

Recommendations and Implications
Recommendations
There are a number of recommendations to be made resulting from the study. They are
primarily concerned with the further exploration of the security decay theory.

The results of this investigation were reasonably restricted, providing in a number of
cases conclusive results which are however un- generalisable, and in other cases,
providing generally inconclusive results.

The first recommendation is for the theory as a whole to be scrutinised under a
longitudinal study. It is envisaged that such a study would be inherently complex,
involving accurate assessments of attitudes mwards security and how they may vary
over time. Also and in doing this, examining the factors which are influencing these
attitudes. If such a study were to be successful, it would provide the security manager
with invaluable infonnation which would allow him I her to address the problem at
the cause.

The study did not address the security decay theory in its entirety. In further
exploration of the theory, the way in which management reacts to threat
materialisation needs to be examined. It is postulated that when decay is evident,
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management often react with an over emphasis of security. This results because either
they are not heeding the advice of the risk assessor, or they are interpreting the risk
data incorrectly.

When security decay's, the amount of residual risk may increase, however the original
level of risk exposure may or may not change. This is because the implemented
countermeasures have reduced the risk exposure to a level that the organisation is
willing to accept. That risk which remains is residual risk and when a vulnerability
such as decay arises, the countermeasures reduce in effectiveness, therefore causing
the amount of residual risk to increase. The level of risk exposure will only change
when a factor within the external environment changes, or when the internal
vulnerability is so severe as to cause an increase in the level of risk exposure. It is
recommended that the reaction to risk materialisation be studied, taking into account
the various reasons resulting in a need to react and how that reaction influences both
residual risk and risk exposure.

Another recommendation is concerned with the need to develop security theory which
is applicable. Gale (1994) in discussing the value added role of security stated that;

"For while it may be interesting and even thought- provoking to construct an
abstract model, managers must be able to use the model in pragmatic contexts
and be assured that the results will indeed be beneficial."
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The security decay theory is a long way from extending beyond being an abstract
model, however this must be the primary goal in conducting further research. The
results from this study suggest that at least certain elements of the security decay
theory appear to be valid, which will provide a starting block towards the generation
of an applicable model.

Implications for Security Specialists
Security managers, consultants and advisers must be aware of the ramifications of
having effective security. While effective security is to be the objective, ensuring it
remains effective requires constant review. Although there is no firm data to support
the hypothesis (the respondents in this study were unsure), it is postulated by the
security decay theory that effective security may result in attitudes of apathy towards
security. This should be taken into consideration when reacting to threat occurrence. If
not, a level of protection could be implemented which is both unnecessary and
expensive.

An unexpected implication of the study arises from the inconclusive results derived
from the non- security sample. The fact that the respondents from within this sample
were unsure as to all sub - concepts highlights the ignorance of security by those
people who are not tasked with providing it. The need for continual awareness and
education programs becomes apparent as a result of these findings. Awareness and
education programs will not only aid in heightening the awareness of security's role,
but it should, if carried out correctly, reduce apathy towards security.
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CHAPTER7

Conclusion
The discipline of security lacks formal conceptual tools which can be used by security
managers, advisers and consultants when attempting to provide effective security.
This is because of security's relative age as a discipHne, it is still being developed.
Many technological, socio!ogical and psychological theories can be applied to a
security function, while other theories such as Defence in Depth and CPTED have
been developed with security as a frame of reference.

The aim of the study was to contribute to the security discipline by taking
Underwood's (1989) idea of security decay and formalising and exploring it. This was
achieved by outlining the security decay theory and in part, testing people's attitude
towards it.

The security decay theory is primarily concerned with the infi\Jence apathy has on
security and how management react to risk materialisation when decay is evident. The
study focused on the first of these. two components. There are a number of variables
within the section of the theory that was under examination which include; effective
security, the prevention of threat occurrence, apathy and decay. The variables
represent a linear process as presented and each variable must be present before the
other can be attributed.
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Each of these variables were addressed in one of three Likert tests. The Likert test
instrument allows the respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the
statement presented to them, and when combining response options chosen with
recognised numerical values, one is able to determine their attitude relative to the
concept under examination.

A Likert test (Security Specialist Test- Test I Part A) was administered to a security
specialist sample and addressed the question; What constitutes effective security? A
second Likert test (Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2) was administered to nonsecurity people addressing the question; Does effective security cause an attitude of
apathy towards the provision of security? A third Likert test (Security Specialist Test Test I Part B) was again administered to the security specialist sample addressing the
research question; Does an apathetic attitude towards security result in security
decaying?

The two tests administered to the security specialist sample provided results from
which some determinations could be made. The Security Specialist Test - Test I Part
A consisted of a number of sub- concepts which may be included in an effective
security function, allowing one to argue that effective security consists of many varied
elements, with the over riding factor being the ability to reduce risk exposure to an
acceptable level. The Security Specialist Test- Test 1 Part B provided conclusive
results, suggesting, but without proving, that apathetic attitudes towards security will
result in security decaying
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The Security Effectiveness Test- Test 2 which was administered to the non - security
sample, produced inconclusive results. This sample proved to be indecisive, neither
agreeing nor disagreeing with whether or not effective security will lead to a lack of
security incidence and in tum apathy. Therefore no conclusions could be drawn.

The results achieved are only representative of the attitudes of the respondents from
within the sample. The two tests that derived conclusive results can not be generalised
across the whole security specialist population. This was the major limitation of the
investigation.

The recommendations resulting from the study include the need to further research the
security decay theory in a longitudinal study, as well as researching the section of the
theory which was excluded in this study. A longitudinal study may produce
generalisable results which may in fact, lead to the security decay theory being one of
theoretical value.

The implications for security specialists are that they need to have an awareness of the
ramifications of having effective security. Although some results were inconclusive, it
is postulated by the security decay theory that when effective security is achieved,
attitudes of apathy towards security are most likely. Also, the fact that the nonsecurity sample were generally unsure about all sub- concepts put to them highlights
the need for efficient and effective awareness and education programs.
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Appendix A
Security Specialist Test • Test 1
Part A
I.

The assessing of threat must be
conducted for security to be
effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

2.

The assessing of criticality must
be carried out if security is to be
effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

3.

Detennining probability of threat
occurrence is an important
component of a security program

SA

A

NS

D

SD

4.

effective security is achieved when
security managers habitually react
to incidence without prior analysis

SA

A

NS

D

SD

5.

effective security is achieved with
the practicing of risk management
which allows the analyst to pre·
empt security incidence in both
frequency and consequences

SA

A

NS

D

SD

6.

rather than the ability to reduce
security risk, security should only
be deemed effective when all risk
is eliminated

SA

A

NS

D

SD

7.

unless the risk is known in the
absolute, money should not be
spent on security initiatives

SA

A

NS

D

SD

8.

effective security will be a profit
generating operation for the
organisation

SA

A

NS

D

SD

9.

for security to be effective, one
does not need to consider threat

SA

A

NS

D

SD

10.

The frequency of security threat
occurrence need not be assessed
for security to be deemed effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

II.

security will only be effective
when it focuses upon the security
releYance of people, technology
and infonnation

SA

A

NS

D

SD

12.

Generic management processes
are irrelevant to the management
of a security function

SA

A

NS

D

SD
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13.

security can only be effective with
company wide support, thereby
warranting integration

SA

A

NS

D

SD

14.

in order for security to become
effective, it needs to continually
communicate its message via
awareness and education programs

SA

A

NS

D

SD

15.

effective security will be a
financial burden on the
organisation

SA

A

NS

D

SD

16.

The assessment of criticality I
consequence is not required for a
security program to be effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

17.

a security function which reduces
identified threat consequence will
be deemed effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

18.

a security function which reduces
identified threat frequency will be
deemed effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

19.

in detennining whether or not
security is effective, an analysis of
its ability to generate profit is not
considered

SA

A

NS

D

SD

20.

security is more likely to be
effective when it incorporates
generic managerial processes

SA

A

NS

D

SD

21.

for security to be effective, the
security manager must work
towards integrating the security
function into all organisational
areas

SA

A

NS

D

SD

22.

security can fulfil its aims without
the co - operation of company
personnel

SA

A

NS

D

SD

23.

security is a distinctly separate
function and should exist outside
the realm of all other
organisational departments

SA

A

NS

D

SD

24.

awareness programs are only one
factor that must be established so
that security can be effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

25.

the application of security theory
will not influence security
effectiveness as security theories
are, in the main, irrelevant

SA

A

NS

D

SD
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26.

investigations are unimportant
when attempting to achieve a state
of effective security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

27.

intelligence will provide the
necessary proactive element in a
security program

SA

A

NS

D

SD

28.

a security function need only be
reactive in order to be effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

29.

the process of self evaluation is
unnecessary and is a burden on
security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

30.

security programs that implement
security theory such as defence in
depth and CPTED are more likely
to be effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

31.

no standard of effectiveness need
be set for the security function

SA

A

NS

D

SD

32.

security need not be concerned
with legal issues

SA

A

NS

D

SD

33.

security can be effective regardless
of the security managers
knowledge of security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

34.

a security function need only be
proactive in order to be effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

35.

investigations will provide the
reactive clement in a security
program

SA

A

NS

D

SD

36.

the security function must
establish a means of determining
effectiveness in order to justify
expenditure

SA

A

NS

D

SD

37.

the security function must have an
understanding of how the relevant
laws will influence the way in
which operations are conducted
to ensure security is effective, the
security manager and officers must
uphold extremely high integrity

SA

A

NS

D

SD

SA

A

NS

D

SD

SA

A

NS

D

SD

38.

39.

to ensure the organisation is not
liable to litigation, the security
function should ensure all policies
and procedures are formally
documented
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40.

security can only be effective if it
undergoes a process of self
evaluation to determine whether
the defined objectives have been
met

SA

A

NS

D

SD

41.

continual security awareness and
education programs are
unnecessary as security can be
effective without these programs

SA

A

NS

D

SD

42.

for security to be effective, an
investigation capability is
necessary

SA

A

NS

D

SD

43.

intelligence is an irrelevant
practice in effective security
programs

SA

A

NS

D

SD

44.

both reactive and proactive
elements are required for security
to be effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

45.

the use of intelligence is a vital
component in ensuring security is
effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

46.

security managers must have
sufficient knowledge of security in
order for security to be effective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

47.

a security manager's integrity has
no influence on the effectiveness
of security

SA

A

NS

D

SD
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Appendix~

Security Specialist Test • Test 1
PartB
I.

the effectiveness of security is
dependant on the compliance by
staff in following procedure~

SA

A

NS

D

SD

2.

security will remain unchanged
when procedures and polices ace
not complied with

SA

A

NS

D

SD

3.

when people become apathetic
towards security, security's ability
to counter threats diminish

SA

A

NS

D

SD

4.

situations whereby staff perceive
security to be unnecessary will
cause the level of security
effectiveness to decrease

SA

A

NS

D

SD

5.

to ensure effective security,
security managers must have staff
support for all implemented
security policies and procedures

SA

A

NS

D

SD

6.

compliance by staff of the security
procedures has no bearing on the
effectiveness of security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

7.

security will remain effective
when slaff become apathetic

SA

A

NS

D

SD

8.

security has decayed when
procedures and polices are not
complied with

SA

A

NS

D

SD

9.

when staff become apathetic
towards security, security wUI
decay

SA

A

NS

D

SD

10.

security managers can reasonably
suspect that security will be
effective, whether or not the staff
support the initiatives
implemented

SA

A

NS

D

SD

II.

security's level of effectiveness is
in no way effected by the negative
perception staff have of security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

12.

security's ability to counter threats
will not diminish when people
become apathetic towards security

SA

A

NS

D

SD
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AppendixC
Security Effectiveness Test • Test 2
I.

effective security is an achievable
state

SA

A

NS

D

SD

2.

when security is effective, security
risk will be reduced

SA

A

NS

D

SD

3.

threat occurrence is unlikely when
security is ineffective

SA

A

NS

D

SD

4.

you do not follow security
procedures when you feel they arc
unnecessary

SA

A

NS

D

SD

5.

effective security is not an
achievable state

SA

A

NS

D

SD

6.

effective security will not reduce
breaches of security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

7.

a Jack of security knowledge
results in apathy towards security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

8.

even though security procedures in
place seem unnecessary, you still
comply with them

SA

A

NS

D

SD

9.

a lack of security kno~,~;ledge ha.<;
no bearing on the degree of apathy
towards security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

10.

when security is effective, threat
occurrence is unlikely

SA

A

NS

D

SD

II.

when one is not aware of the
importance of security, one is
likely to be apathetic

SA

A

NS

D

SD

12.

when you do not experience
security incidents, you become
apathetic towards security

SA

A

NS

D

SD

13.

a lack of security incidence will
result in one perceiving security to
be unnecessary

SA

A

NS

D

SD
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14.

when you do not experience
security incidents, you remain
compliant with all security
procedures and policies

SA

A

NS

D

SD

15.

when you do nnt experience
breaches of security, you become
complacent towards security

SA

A

NS

D

SD
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AppendixD
Face Validity - Security Specialist Evaluation and Effectiveness Tests

The security specialist evaluation test and the security effectiveness test were
examined by Clif Smith with the purpose of examining the effectiveness of the
instruments to perform the functions outlined by their objectives. The tests are setting
out to gain insight into the perceptions of effective security and security decay by
experienced security personnel at security management and consultant levels, as weJI
a~

non security people alike.

The tests are composed of strong statements in several categories to be responded to
by a Likert scale. An examination of the tests shows them to be substantial in content
and application, and that the tests will most satisfactorily fulfil their functional
requirements.

The tests have face validity for the proposed function and applications of the
instruments.

Associate Professor Clifton Smith
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AppendixE
Pilot Study Raw Data - Security Specialist Test - Test 1 (Part A)
Statements
I.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

The assessing of threm
must be conducted for
securitv to be effective
The assessing of
criticality must be
carried out if security is
to be effective
Determining probability
of threat occurrence is a
vital component of a
secur!tv orol!ram
effective security is
achieved when security
managers habitually
react to incidence
without orior analvsis
effective security is
achieved with the
practicing of risk
management which
allows the analyst to pre
• empt security
incidence in both
frequency and
consequences
rather than the ability to
reduce security ri!.k,
security should only be
deemed effective when
all risk is eliminated
money should not be
spent on security unless
the risk is known in the
absolute
effective security will
be a profit generating
operation for the
orl!anisation
One need not review
threat for security to be
effective
The frequency of
security threat
occurrence is a factor
which need not be
assessed for security to
be deemed effective

SA

A

2

I

2

I

2

NS

D

I

I

I

SD

2

2

3

I

2

I

I

I

2

2

2
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IL

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

security will only be
effective when it
focuses upon the
security relevance of
people, technology and
information
Generic management
processes are irrelevant
to the management of a
securitv function
security can only be
effective with company
wide support, thereby
warranting integration
in order for security to
become effective. it
needs to continually
communicate its
message via awareness
and education pro.e:rams
effective security will
be a financial burden on
the organisation
effective security is
dctennined hy its ahility
to g.enerate profit
The assessment of
criticality I consequence
is not required for a
security program to be
effective
a security function
which reduce.<;
identified threats in
both consequence and
frequency will be
deemed effective
security's ahility to
generate profit does not
factor into an analysis
of whether security is
effective
security is more likely
to be effective when it
incorporates generic
mana~erial processes

I

2

I

2

I

2

2

I

I

2

3

2

I

I

I

I

I

I

2

2
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Statements
21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.
29.

30.

31.

for security to be
effective, the security
manager must work
towards integrating the
security function into all
or~anisational areas
security can fulfil its
aims without the co •
operation of company
I personnel
security is a distinctly
separate function and
should exist outside the
realm of all other
organisational
departments
awareness programs are
only one factor that
must be established so
that security can be
effective
the application of
security theory will not
influence security
effectiveness as security
theories arc, in the
main, irrelevant
investigations are
unimportant when
attempting to achieve a
state of effective
security
intelligence will provide
the necessary proactive
element in a security
I pro}!:ram
a security function need
only be reactive in
order to be effective
the process of self
evaluation is
unnecessary and is a
burden on security
security programs that
implement security
theory such as defence
in depth and CPTED
are more likely to be
effective
no standard of
effectiveness need be
set for the security
function

SA

A

NS

D

SD

3

I

2

3

I

2

3

2

I

2

I

3

I

2

2

I

3
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Statements
32.

33.

34.
35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

security need not be
concerned with legal
issues
security can be effective
regardless of the
security managers
knowled.e:e of security
a security function need
only be proactive in
order to be effective
investigations will
provide the reactive
clement in a security
program
the security function
must establish a means
of determining
effectiveness in order to
justify expenditure
the security function
must have an
understanding of how
the relevant Jaws will
influence the way in
which operations arc
conducted
to ensure security is
effective, the security
manager and officers
must uphold extremely
hi.e;h intc~rity
to ensure the
organisation is not
liable to litigation, the
security function should
ensure all policies and
procedures arc formally
documcnt::d
security can only be
effective if it undergoes
a process of self
evaluation to detennine
whether the defined
objectives have been

SA

NS

A

I

I

I

2

I

2

I

D

SD

I

2

I

I

2

I

I

2

I

J

3

J

mot

41.

continual s~curity
awareness and
education programs arc
unnecessary as security
can be effective without
these programs
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Statements
42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

the use of investigations
play an important role
in ensuring security is
effective
intelligence is an
irrelevant practice in
effective security
I programs
both reactive and
proactive clements arc
required for security to
be effective
the usc of intelligence is
a vital component in
ensuring security is
effective
security managers must
have suflicient
knowledge of security
in order for security to
be effective
the integrity and
previous history nf the
security manager will
have nn innuencc on
the effectiveness nf
security

SA
I

A

NS

I

D

SD

I

3

2

I

3

2

I

I

I

I
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Pilot Study Raw Data • Security Effectiveness Test - Test 2
Statements
I.
2.

J.

••
5.

6.

7.
R.

9.

10.

II.

12.

13.

effective ~curity is 0:1n
achievable state
when security is
effective, l>C<:urity risk
will be rcdu..:ed
when l>Ccurit~ i~
eliminating !>l"curity
nsl. the need fm
sccurit\' decn::a..'e~
threat tx:curren..:e i~
unlikely \\hen So~:..:urny
is ineffcctiv.::
you dn nn: foil ow
sc..:urity rro..:edun.:~
\\hen ynu kd they arc
unnccessan·
effe..:tin:: ~ccurity JS not
an a..:hievahlc ~tate
effective security will
not reduce breaches of
security
a lack of security
knowledge re~ults in
apathv towards ~ecuriw
even though security
procedures in place
seem unnecessary. you
still comply with them
a lack of security
knowledge has no
bearing on the degree of
apathy towards security
when security is
effective, threat
occurrence is unlikely
when security is
eliminating security
risk, security
procedures arc
maintained
when one is not aware
of the importance of
security, one is likely to
be apathetic

SA

A

NS

D

SD

J
I

I

I

2

I

2

I

I
2

3
I

I

I

J

J

I

2

2

I

2

J
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Statements
14.

15.

16.

17.

when you do not
experience security
incidents, you become
apathetic towards
security
a lack of security
incidence will result in
one perceiving security
to be unnecessary
when you do not
experience security
incidents, you remain
compliant with all
security procedures and
I policic~
when you do not
experience breaches of
security, you become
complacent towards
securit•·

SA

A

I

2

NS

D

so

3

2

I

3
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Pilot Study - Security Specialist Test - Test 1 (Part B)
Statements
I.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

I I.

the effectiveness of
security is dependant on
the compliance by staff
in followinf!: procedures
security will remain
unchanged when
procedures and polices
arc not comolied with
when people become
apathetic towards
security, security's
ability to counter threats
diminish
siluations whereby staff
perceive security to he
unnece:,;sary will cause
the level of security
effectiveness to
decrease
to ensure effective
security, security
managers must have
staff support for all
implemented security
nolicics and procedures
compliance by staff of
the security procedures
has no hearing on the
effectiveness of sc,~urity
security will remain
effective when staff
become apathetic
security has decayed
when procedures and
polices arc not
complied with
when staff become
apathetic towards
security, security will
decav
security managers can
rea~onably suspect that
security will be
effective, whether or
not the staff support the
initiatives implemented
security's level of
effectiveness is in no
way effected by the
negative perception
staff have of security

SA

A

NS

2

I

I

D

I

so

I

3

2

I

2

I

3

I

I

2

2

I

2

3

3
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12.

security's ability to
counter threats will not
diminish when people
become apathetic
towards security

3
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AppendixF
Security Decay • the erosion of effective security
This study is being conducted in order to fulfil the research component of the
Bachelor Of Science (Security) Honours degree at Edith Cowan University. This
research is being conducted independently, with the researcher having no affiliations
with any organisation or institution.

The study is focusing on a new theory in security called "security decay" and it is
hoped that with your participation, an insight will be achieved into the perceived
relevance and merit llfthe theory.

Below you will find some statements about effective security and the relationship
between apathetic attitudes towards security and security decay. I would like to know
what your feeling is regarding each statement. There are no right or wrong answers so
chose the response option you feel is the most appropriate.

Opposite each statement is a response option. Please circle the response option you
feel is most appropriate and be sure to answer every statement.

You will remain anonymous, unless you wish to be personally acknowledged for your
participation.

Thank you for your a'isistance

Shawn McClure
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Code
SA

Strongly Agree

A

Agree

NS

Not Sure

D

Disagree

SD

Strongly Disagree
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AppendixG
Mean Statement Scores
Security Specialist Test • Test 1 (Part A)
Management of the Security Function
Statements

Mean Score

I.

4.73
4.80
4.67
4.20
4.47
4.47
4.00
3.67
4.53
4.00
3.93
4.53
4.67
4.33
4.27
3.80
3.67
3.67
4.27
4.53
4.60
4.40
4.67
4.13
4.40

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.

12.
13.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
28.
34.
44.
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Awareness I Education
Statements
14.
24.
41.

Mean Score
4.60
4.47
4.53

Application of Security Theory
Statements
25.
30.

Mean Score
4.40
4.27

Investigation I Intelligence
Statements
26.
27.
35.
42.
43.
45.

Mean Score
3.80
3.60
2.60
3.93
4.40
4.20

Determining I Measuring Effectiveness
Statements
29.
31.
36.
40.

Mean Score
4.60
4.73
4.33
4.47

Legal Aspects
Statements
32.
37.
39.

Mean Score
4.67
4.47
4.60
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Professionalism of the Security Manager
Statements
33.
38.
46.
47.

Mean Score
3.80
4.53
3.87
4.53
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Security Effectiveness Test - Test 2
Effective security is an achievable state
Statements
I.
5.

Mean Score
3.92
3.92

Effective security causes a lack of security incidence
Statements
2.
3.
6.
10.

Mean Score
4.25
3.67
3.67
3.17

A lack of security incidence causes apathy towards security
Statements
4.
7.
8.
9.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Mean Score
2.42
3.92
2.42
3.50
3.83
3.58
3.58
2.50
3.67
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Security Specialist Test - Test 1 (Part B)
An attitude of apathy causes decay
Statements

Mean Score

I.

4.33
3.20
4.60
4.53
4.27
4.60
4.47
4.27
4.33
4.27
4.47
4.33

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
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